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IN A WORLD OF “FAKE NEWS,”
WHAT’S A SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM TO DO?
Evelyn Mary Aswad*
Abstract
While the circulation of disinformation and misinformation online
can pose a variety of risks to societies around the world, it should also be
of concern that overreacting to such false information can undermine
human rights, including freedom of expression. The business operations
of global social media platforms frequently intersect with this latter
concern because of a spike in the adoption of national laws that ban “fake
news” as well as their own platform policies to tackle false information.
This Essay assesses the corporate responsibility standards afforded by the
United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights as well
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and explains
several key ways in which the guidance that these instruments provide is
relevant to social media companies in tackling false information on their
platforms.
INTRODUCTION
Strong protections for democratic freedoms are necessary to ensure that
the internet does not become a Trojan horse for tyranny and oppression.1
In its 2019 report on internet freedom, Freedom House—a non-profit human
rights organization—focused a spotlight on how governments and non-state actors
throughout the world intentionally manipulate and undermine the connectivity that
social media provides to infringe human rights and engage in election interference. 2
The report highlighted that such interference generally occurs in the form of three
*
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1
ADRIAN SHAHBAZ & ALLIE FUNK, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2019: THE
CRISIS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 2 (2019), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/201911/11042019_Report_FH_FOTN_2019_final_Public_Download.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4
YJ-N5UE].
2
Id. at 6–20. This report examines the situation in “65 countries around the globe,
covering 87 percent of the world’s internet users. . . . [The countries] represent diverse
geographical regions and regime types.” Id. at 4.
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types of measures. First, state and private actors have engaged in informational
measures, such as creating false information, developing effective dissemination
networks for such information (including automated accounts), and infiltrating real
social media accounts.3 Second, governments have engaged in technical measures
to restrict online communications and connectivity, including restricting access to
particular websites or the internet altogether.4 Third, governmental authorities have
also deployed legal measures to punish online falsehoods, such as laws banning the
defamation of rulers.5
With respect to legal measures, a recent troubling trend shows governments
citing to the rise of disinformation and misinformation6 to justify new laws that
prohibit online falsehoods and often require social media platforms to assist in
implementing such measures.7 Within the one-year period from June 2017 through
May 2018, “at least 17 countries approved or proposed laws that would restrict
3
Id. at 6–9. For example, in India, the Prime Minister sent millions of people
“misleading and inflammatory content” through an app “marketed to all Indians as a way to
keep up with official government news.” Id. at 8. In the Philippines, “political operatives
spread information through closed groups on public platforms, where there is less content
moderation. . . .” Id. They also paid online social media personalities who are “microinfluencers” to endorse particular politicians, which gave the impression of authentic
endorsements and helped political operatives avoid campaign spending limits. Id.
4
Id. at 9. In Egypt, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe, the governments blocked access to
websites that were critical of government officials. Id. In Bangladesh, the government
“repeatedly restricted mobile internet service throughout the country prior to and on election
day.” Id.
5
Id. at 10. Turkey, India, and Malawi arrested and/or brought criminal charges against
those who engaged in online speech that defamed their rulers. Id. Bangladesh adopted a new
law prohibiting propaganda while Thai officials issued vague rules about online discourse
involving elections. Id.
6
This Essay uses the term “disinformation” as defined by Claire Wardle and Hossein
Derakhshan: “information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social
group, organization or country.” Samuel Spies, Defining “Disinformation,” MEDIAWELL
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://mediawell.ssrc.org/literature-reviews/defining-disinformation/versi
ons/1-0/ [https://perma.cc/7DNJ-HZXM]. This Essay also uses Wardle and Derakhshan’s
definition of “misinformation,” i.e., “information that is false, but not created with the
intention of causing harm.” Id.
7
Allie Funk, Citing ‘Fake News,’ Singapore Could Be Next to Quash Freedom of
Expression, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63522/citing-fakenews-singapore-could-be-next-to-quash-free-expression/
[https://perma.cc/9QTJ-Y8R5]
(noting a regional trend in Asia to ban falsehoods, including in China, Cambodia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Vietnam); David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Freedom of Expression and
Elections in the Digital Age, 8–9, U.N. Research Paper 1/2019 (June 2019) [hereinafter
Elections in the Digital Age], https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Elections
ReportDigitalAge.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6EG-2CHY] (expressing concern “with recent
legislative and regulatory initiatives to restrict ‘fake news’ and disinformation” throughout
the world, including in Italy, Malaysia, and France).
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online media in the name of fighting ‘fake news’ and online manipulation.”8 These
laws have taken hold throughout the world, including in Western democracies such
as Canada.9 Human rights watchdogs have consistently criticized these laws as
violations of international freedom of expression protections.10
Should governments and platforms seek to ban online falsehoods? Does
exercising corporate responsibility mean social media platforms should assist or
resist the implementation of laws that outlaw the dissemination of online
falsehoods? Regardless of national laws on this topic, what does corporate
responsibility mean in the context of global platforms’ own policies on
disinformation and misinformation?
Part I of this Essay sets forth the international standards for corporate
responsibility and freedom of expression. Part II examines how platforms should
apply these standards amid a proliferation of laws banning falsehoods, with a
particular focus on a high-profile law recently adopted in Singapore. This Part also
reflects on what these standards mean for platform policies, particularly with regard
to political advertisements. Part III concludes by contemplating the usefulness of the
global corporate responsibility framework in helping companies react in a principled
manner to “fake news” laws as well as guiding the development of their own
platform policies on false information.

8

Funk, supra note 7. Nigeria is one of the countries to most recently consider adoption
of a “fake news” ban. Danielle Paquette, Nigeria’s ‘Fake News’ Bill Could Jail People for
Lying on Social Media. Critics Call it Censorship., WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019, 8:46 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/nigerias-fake-news-bill-could-jail-peoplefor-lying-on-social-media-critics-call-it-censorship/2019/11/25/ccf33c54-0f81-11ea-a53390a7becf7713_story.html [https://perma.cc/5CVE-UKB2] (reporting that Nigeria’s draft bill
would criminalize speech that could “threaten national security, sway elections or ‘diminish
public confidence’ in the government” and Internet access could be disrupted for violators).
9
See Michael Karanicolas, Canada’s Fake News Laws Face a Charter Challenge.
That’s a Good Thing, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Oct. 14, 2019), https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/
columnists/karanicolas-canadas-fake-news-laws-face-a-charter-challenge-thats-a-goodthing [https://perma.cc/6BDK-T2LD] (discussing a variety of overbroad provisions in
Canada’s new law banning falsehoods during campaigns, which “gives the government a
potential weapon to wield against its critics” and “can exert a chilling effect against
legitimate speech, particularly when a prison term is attached to the offence.”).
10
See, e.g., Elections in the Digital Age, supra note 7; Funk, supra note 7; Jordan:
Fake News Amendments Need Revision, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 21, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/21/jordan-fake-news-amendments-need-revision [https:
//perma.cc/2SW5-AGMR]; Philippines: Reject Sweeping ‘Fake News’ Bill, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 25, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/25/philippines-rejectsweeping-fake-news-bill [https://perma.cc/2D5W-VZQG]; Singapore: Reject Sweeping
‘Fake News’ Bill, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 3, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2019/04/03/singapore-reject-sweeping-fake-news-bill
[https://perma.cc/6ZAEUAN2].
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE UN’S HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. The UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights
The U.S. government has repeatedly encouraged American companies to
implement the corporate responsibility standards set forth in the United Nations
(UN) Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights (UNGPs) and to treat them
as a floor rather than a ceiling in their operations.11 The UNGPs were first adopted
by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011 and reflect international expectations for
how companies should act when their operations intersect with human rights
issues.12 The UNGPs state that companies have a “responsibility to respect human
rights,” which means they should (1) avoid “infringing on the human rights of
others” and (2) address “adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved.”13
Under this global corporate responsibility framework, companies are expected
to proactively engage in a variety of measures, including adopting and
mainstreaming human rights policies that implement the UNGPs, hiring appropriate
staff to implement those policies, and engaging with external stakeholders to learn
about potential human rights impacts.14 Moreover, companies are supposed to
conduct due diligence to determine the human rights risks of their operations and to
devise strategies to avoid undermining rights15 as well as communicate publicly on
their plans to address potential harms.16 Where national law is inconsistent with
international human rights law standards, companies are expected to actively seek
paths to avoid infringing on human rights, but they are not supposed to violate local
law.17 As is frequently noted, the UNGPs mandate that companies “know and show,”
11

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT: FIRST NATIONAL
ACTION PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (2016), https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/265918.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWL5-8EVB]; U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. GOVERNMENT
APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2013), https://photos.state.gov/libraries/
korea/49271/july_2013/dwoa_USG-Approach-on-Business-and-Human-Rights-updated
June2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QEX-X4YT].
12
See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011);
John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].
13
UNGPs, supra note 12, at princ. 11.
14
Id. at princs. 16, 18, 19.
15
Id. at princs. 17, 19–20.
16
Id. at princ. 21.
17
Id. at princ. 23(a), (b), cmt. Companies are expected to respect international human
rights standards even if the countries they operate in have not undertaken international law
obligations regarding those standards. Id. at princ. 11 cmt.
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which means know their potential human rights impacts and show what they are
doing about it.18
When social media companies tackle disinformation and misinformation—
either pursuant to “fake news” laws or under their own “platform law”19—one of the
most salient human rights that will be impacted is freedom of expression.20 For social
media companies to implement the UNGPs, they need to understand the scope of
the right to freedom of expression under international human rights law21 in order to
assess potential infringements on expression. Such infringements in the context of
combatting “fake news” will often happen either by (1) helping a government to
implement a law that is inconsistent with international protections for expression or
(2) adopting business models or platform law that adversely affect the enjoyment of
freedom of expression. The next section therefore focuses on the international
standard for freedom of expression as that is key for determining whether a company
is infringing on freedom of expression under either of these two scenarios.
B. The International Standard for Freedom of Expression
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which is one of the foundational treaties in the United Nations’ human rights system,

18

Id. at princ. 15 cmt.
The phrase “platform law” was used by the United Nations’ top free expression
expert to refer to the rules that social media companies (which he called “enigmatic
regulators”) deploy to regulate human activity on their platforms. David Kaye (Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 1, 63, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018)
[hereinafter UN SR 2018 Report].
20
See Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 26, 39–40 (2018). Additional important human rights, such as privacy, can be
adversely affected in this context as well, but the focus of this Essay regards freedom of
expression.
21
The UNGPs define “human rights” according to UN instruments rather than regional
ones. UNGPs, supra note 12, at princ. 12, cmt. (citing to the UN’s international bill of human
rights and related UN instruments as defining the content of international human rights
standards). The UN’s international protections for human rights can be broader than regional
human rights approaches. See David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, ¶¶ 26–27 U.N. Doc. A/74/486 (Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter UN SR 2019 Report]
(noting that the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to freedom of expression has
often fallen short of international protections for speech and that regional norms cannot be
invoked to justify departures from international standards). To implement the UNGPs,
companies therefore should be focused on international human rights standards.
19
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provides the international standard for protecting free expression.22 In particular,
Article 19(2) establishes a broad right to seek and receive information of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers and through any media.23 Article 19(3) permits governments
to limit speech when they can prove that a three-prong test is met.24 To be valid,
speech restrictions must be: (1) “provided by law” and (2) “necessary” to (3) achieve
an enumerated public interest objective (i.e., protection of the rights or reputations
of others, national security, public order, or public health or morals).25
1. The “Provided by Law” Condition
The independent experts that comprise the UN human rights machinery’s
oversight mechanisms have recommended interpretations for ICCPR Article 19,
which help apply the tripartite test. For example, the Human Rights Committee,
which is the body of independent experts charged with overseeing ICCPR
implementation and elected by the treaty’s State Parties, has interpreted “provided
by law” to mean, inter alia, that a law “must be formulated with sufficient precision
to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly . . . .”26 The UN
Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, the UN’s top expert
focused on the state of free speech in all UN member states, has endorsed this

22
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E,
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
23
Id. at art. 19 ¶ 2.
24
Id. at art. 19 ¶ 3.
25
Id. It should be noted that UN instruments also contain mandatory bans on hateful
speech, but such bans also must pass ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test to be valid. See
UN SR 2019 Report, supra note 21, at ¶¶ 13–16. In addition, speech restrictions should be
consistent with the ICCPR’s other protections, including the prohibition on discrimination.
See ICCPR, supra note 22, at arts. 2, 26 (prohibiting discrimination when State Parties
implement the treaty’s obligations and requiring State Parties to guarantee equal protection
of the law without discrimination based on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status). The ICCPR does,
however, permit State Parties to derogate from their freedom of expression obligations
during certain public emergencies if particular conditions are met. Id. at art. 4(1) (“In time
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their
other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.”).
26
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter GC 34]. The Committee has further explained
that “[a] law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression
on those charged with its execution.” Id.
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interpretation27 and provided significant guidance on terminology that is
inappropriately vague.28
The Special Rapporteur has further elaborated on the issue of vagueness in the
context of “fake news” laws. For example, in a joint statement with regional free
expression experts, the Special Rapporteur has opined that “[g]eneral prohibitions
on the dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including
‘false news’ or ‘non-objective information,’ are incompatible with international
standards . . . and should be abolished.”29 The Special Rapporteur has also reacted
to specific “fake news” laws adopted or considered in various countries, which has
resulted in further clarification of phraseology that is improperly vague. For
instance, the Special Rapporteur criticized an Italian law for banning “unfounded,”
“biased,” “false,” and “fake” information, noting such words do not give sufficient
notice of what is off-limits to individuals or government officials implementing the
law, which can empower censorship and chill speech.30

27

See, e.g., David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 12, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/71/373 (Sept. 6, 2016) [hereinafter UN SR 2016 Report] (restrictions must “be
formulated with sufficient precision to enable both the individual and those charged with its
execution to regulate conduct accordingly and be made accessible to the public. It cannot
confer discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its
execution.”); UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 19, at ¶ 7 (enunciating that restrictions on
speech must “limit government discretion in a manner that distinguishes between lawful and
unlawful expression with ‘sufficient precision’”). The Special Rapporteur has also made
clear that “[r]ules should be subject to public comment and regular legislative or
administrative processes. Procedural safeguards, especially those guaranteed by independent
courts or tribunals, should protect rights.” UN SR 2019 Report, supra note 21, at ¶ 6.
28
For example, the Special Rapporteur has criticized as unduly vague draft Chinese
legislation that would ban engaging “in activities harming national security” or that “upset
social order”; Kenyan legislation that criminalized “obscene, gory or offensive material
which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the general public”; and European counterterrorism approaches that ban the “glorification of terrorism.” UN SR 2016 Report, supra
note 27, at ¶¶ 13–14. The Special Rapporteur has also highlighted inappropriately vague
provisions in the platform law of social media companies. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra
note 19, at ¶ 26 (“Company policies on hate, harassment and abuse also do not clearly
indicate what constitutes an offence. Twitter’s prohibition of ‘behavior that incites fear about
a protected group’ and Facebook’s distinction between ‘direct attacks’ on protected
characteristics and merely ‘distasteful or offensive content’ are subjective and unstable bases
for content moderation.”).
29
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, JOINT DECLARATION
ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND “FAKE NEWS” ¶ 2(a), Mar. 3, 2017, FOM.GAL/3/17,
https://www.osce.org/fom/302796 [https://perma.cc/9NL2-M2VU] [hereinafter Fake News
Declaration]. This Joint Declaration also specifies that the “human right to impart
information and ideas is not limited to ‘correct’ statements. . . .” Id. at preambular para. 7.
30
Elections in the Digital Age, supra note 7, at 9.
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2. The “Necessary” Condition
The second prong of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test requires that any
restriction be “necessary” to achieve an enumerated public interest objective.31 The
word choice of “necessary” is significant. To be acceptable, a speech restriction may
not be merely related to or useful in achieving a public interest goal. As the UN’s
human rights machinery has stated, to prove a restriction is “necessary,”
governments must show, inter alia, it is the “least intrusive means” of achieving the
public interest goal.32
To prove a speech restriction poses the least possible burden on speech, a threepart inquiry should be undertaken.33 First, is it possible to achieve the public interest
goal without restricting speech? This question forces governments to engage in good
governance measures before resorting to speech bans. In the context of combatting
“fake news,” it is important to assess if governments, for example, have promoted
digital and media literacy campaigns to make their populations as resistant as
possible to disinformation and misinformation. It is also important to assess whether
government actors themselves have been spreading such false information.34 A
governmental failure to engage in good governance does not empower governments
to censor speech. Rather, it highlights that such governments have not sought the
least intrusive way of tackling disinformation or misinformation.
Second, if a government can show that good governance measures are
insufficient to achieve the goal, has it selected, from the range of potential options,
the restriction on speech that least burdens expression? An issue that often comes up
in the context of bans on false information is whether the government imposes civil
or criminal sanctions and their level of severity. The UN’s human rights machinery
has repeatedly warned against the use of criminal sanctions for defamation and other
bans on false information.35 The UN Special Rapporteur has concluded that this
31

ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 19 ¶ 3.
GC 34, supra note 26, at ¶ 34 (a restriction “must be the least intrusive instrument
amongst those which might achieve [the] protective function”); UN SR 2018 Report, supra
note 19, at ¶ 7 (“States must demonstrate that the restriction imposes the least burden on the
exercise of the right and actually protects, or is likely to protect, the legitimate State interest
at issue. States may not merely assert necessity but must demonstrate it. . . .”).
33
I proposed this three-part test in 2018, and it was cited to favorably by the UN Special
Rapporteur. See UN SR 2019 Report, supra note 21, at ¶ 52 (citing Evelyn M. Aswad, The
Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26 (2018)).
34
As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur and regional freedom of expression experts,
“[s]tate actors should . . . take care to ensure that they disseminate reliable and trustworthy
information, including about matters of public interest, such as the economy, public health,
security and the environment.” Fake News Declaration, supra note 29, at ¶ 2(d).
35
Id. at ¶ 2(b) (“Criminal defamation laws are unduly restrictive and should be
abolished. Civil law rules on liability for false and defamatory statements are legitimate only
if defendants are given a full opportunity and fail to prove the truth of those statements and
also benefit from other defences, such as fair comment.”); GC 34, supra note 26, at ¶ 47
32
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“presumption against the criminalization of expression also applies to restrictions on
‘fake news’ and disinformation.”36
Lastly, governments must ask whether the speech restrictions they choose
actually help—or are at least likely to help—achieve the public interest objective. If
speech restrictions are not effective in achieving the goal or are counter-productive,
they cannot be defended as “necessary” to achieve the objective. For example,
attempts to ban speech can often raise the profile of certain speech, which defeats
the purpose of the ban.37 In this regard, it should be noted that at all stages in this
three-part inquiry, it is important that policy choices be grounded in evidence-based
decision-making.38
3. The “Legitimacy” Condition
The third prong of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test requires that the reason
for the speech restriction be one of the enumerated public interest objectives listed
in the treaty: (1) “for respect of the rights or reputations of others,” or (2) “the
protection of national security or of public order . . . or of public health or morals.”39
The UN’s Human Rights Committee has made clear that governments cannot invoke
these objectives as pretexts to, for instance, protect the ruling party.40 In the context
of laws banning “fake news,” potentially legitimate governmental interests could
include the rights of others (e.g., the rights to receive information and take part in
elections)41 as well as protection of public order (e.g., if disinformation threatens to
incite imminent violence). That said, the UN Special Rapporteur has found that
governments often invoke the problems of disinformation and misinformation as
pretexts to improperly control speech,42 which is inconsistent with the third prong
of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test.
(“States parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation and, in any case, the
application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and
imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.”).
36
Elections in the Digital Age, supra note 7, at 10.
37
See Justin Parkinson, The Perils of the Streisand Effect, BBC NEWS MAG. (July 31,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28562156 [https://perma.cc/J5X8-G966]
(highlighting attempts by celebrities to remove speech about themselves and demonstrating
how those attempts resulted in significant additional exposure for the information they were
seeking to suppress).
38
See Elections in the Digital Age, supra note 7, at 11.
39
ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 19 ¶ 3.
40
GC 34, supra note 26, at ¶ 30 (highlighting that it is inappropriate for governments
to limit speech on national security grounds when such claims are merely pretexts).
41
Elections in the Digital Age, supra note 7, at 9 (“[D]isinformation and propaganda
may mislead populations and interfere with the public’s right to know, particularly during
elections.”).
42
Id. (“[G]overnments are also capitalizing on the phenomenon of disinformation to
propose and enact laws and regulations that interfere with the freedom of expression by
restricting legitimate speech, especially during elections.”).
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II. UN CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS & “FAKE NEWS” ONLINE
With the rise of “fake news” laws that prohibit falsehoods, social media
companies will need to answer two key questions to ensure they act consistently
with the UNGPs in each country that has adopted such laws. First, is a particular
“fake news” law consistent with international human rights law standards? Second,
if such a law does not meet international human rights standards, what should the
company do to fulfill its responsibility to respect these standards? This Part begins
by unpacking each of these two questions and then turns to how UN corporate
responsibility standards can provide guidance with respect to a social media
company’s own platform law.
A. Singapore’s Recent Online Falsehoods Ban
In October 2019, one of the world’s most recent laws banning “fake news” went
into effect in Singapore: The Protection from Online Falsehoods & Manipulation
Act (POFMA).43 Singapore’s government justified the law’s adoption by referring,
among other things, to the need to protect its society from “hostile parties” who
could “turn different groups against one another and cause disorder.”44 One
governmental official in particular represented to the Parliament that this law would
be necessary to deal with the type of false information that had been circulated online
in 2016 prior to the U.S. elections and the UK’s Brexit vote.45
An overview of POFMA’s key provisions reveals its potential breadth and
impacts. The Act makes it illegal for a person to share—knowingly or having reason
to believe—a “false statement of fact” when that information is, inter alia, likely
“prejudicial” to Singapore’s security, public health, safety or tranquility, “friendly
relations . . . with other countries,” or likely to incite feelings of “ill-will.”46 A
statement is false “if it is false or misleading, whether wholly or in part, and whether

43

James Griffiths, Singapore ‘Fake News’ Law Comes into Force, Offenders Face
Fines and Prison Time, CNN (Oct. 2, 2019, 1:05 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/02/
asia/singapore-fake-news-internet-censorship-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/WUH6KR4N].
44
Id.
45
Adam Taylor, First Target of Singapore’s ‘Fake News’ Law Is Facebook Post that
Alleged Failed State Investment in Restaurant, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2019, 11:04 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/25/first-target-singapores-fake-news-lawis-facebook-post-that-alleged-failed-state-investment-salt-bae/
[https://perma.cc/UPC46QGS].
46
Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (No. 18 of 2019),
June 3, 2019, §§ 7(1)(a)–(b)(i), (ii), (iii), (v), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/POFMA2019?Valid
Date=20191002&TransactionDate=20191007 [https://perma.cc/2DUW-A53K] [hereinafter
POFMA]. This prohibition applies to a person in or outside of Singapore. Id.
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on its own or in the context in which it appears.”47 Violators face criminal penalties
of up to S$50,000 (about US$37,000) and/or five years in prison.48
Without the approval of a judge, any Singapore government minister can order
a person to remove a “false” post or to add a correction to such post if that serves
the public interest.49 Individuals face criminal fines and/or twelve months in prison
for not implementing these orders.50 If a person does not comply with such an order,
then the government can order an internet access service to block access to the
offending statement or order an internet intermediary to correct the offending
material.51 Non-compliant companies can face hefty criminal fines.52 Individuals
and companies can appeal such orders, but the grounds for appeal are limited and
the order remains in effect during the appeal.53
Singapore’s first POFMA enforcement action was against one of the regime’s
political opponents (Brad Bowyer).54 Mr. Bowyer had posted statements critical of
the investments of two state-owned companies, which he implied the government
had influenced in making those financial decisions.55 Invoking POFMA authority,
the Minister of Finance contacted Mr. Bowyer and instructed him to correct his
Facebook post.56 Mr. Bowyer did so by stating that his post contained falsehoods
and telling readers to visit the government’s website for the correct facts.57 Although
Singapore did not require Mr. Bowyer to remove his post or impose a fine or prison
time,58 it was evident that the law was enforced for the purpose of silencing a regime

47
Id. at § 2(2)(b). Also, a statement of “fact” is a “statement which a reasonable person
. . . would consider to be a representation of fact.” Id. at § 2(2)(a).
48
Id. at § 7(2). Additional penalties apply if inauthentic accounts or bots were used to
share falsehoods. Id. at § 7(3).
49
Id. at §§ 10–13. Correction or removal orders can be imposed even if the individual
did not know or have reason to believe a statement was false. Id. at §§ 11(4), 12(4).
50
Id. at § 15(1).
51
Id. at §§ 16, 21. These measures appear geared toward preventing end-users in
Singapore from viewing the “fake news” rather than those outside the country.
52
Id. at §§ 16, 27, 28.
53
Id. at § 29. The grounds for appeal of correction or disabling orders generally involve
arguing (1) the offensive material was not communicated in Singapore; (2) that the statement
was not factual in nature or was true; and (3) that it is technically impossible to comply with
the order. Id. at § 29(5). Before appealing, a request for reconsideration must be made to the
relevant minister who issued the order. Id. at § 29(2).
54
Taylor, supra note 45.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Tim Cushing, Singapore Government Tests Out Its Fake News Law Against an
Opposition Party Leader, TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 27, 2019, 10:42 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20191125/17321343457/singapore-government-testsout-fake-news-law-against-opposition-party-leader.shtml [https://perma.cc/MX64-HAJY]
(concluding that the government’s “initial salvo may have been delivered with a light touch,
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critic, rather than for the reasons originally cited in lobbying for the law’s adoption,
i.e., protecting society from online foreign interference and promoting sectarian
harmony.59
A few days later, Singapore issued its first POFMA order to a platform.60 The
government initially ordered the editor of an Australian website to issue a correction
about a Facebook post that alleged an unlawful arrest had occurred in Singapore, but
the editor refused to implement the order, as he resides outside of Singapore.61 The
government then issued an order to Facebook to post a correction on the offending
post.62 Facebook complied with the order by adding a label to the original post that
said “Facebook is legally required to tell you that the Singapore government says
this post has false information,”63 which could only be seen in Singapore.64
Facebook also included a link to a page that states the company “doesn’t endorse the
truthfulness of either the posts on its site or government corrections.”65 Again, it was
evident that Singapore’s “fake news” law was enforced when the government was
criticized, which serves as a lesson about why giving already powerful authorities
even more power to become arbiters of truth can be so dangerous.66
but when things heat up around elections and the discussion of controversial legislation,
expect the government’s blows to land with a little more force.”).
59
Id.; Taylor, supra note 45.
60
Niharika Mandhana & Phred Dvorak, Ordered by Singapore, Facebook Issues a
Correction, WALL STREET J.: MARKETWATCH (Nov. 30, 2019, 7:15 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ordered-by-singapore-facebook-posts-a-correction2019-11-30 [https://perma.cc/F77L-9Y4Y].
61
Id. The editor says the Singapore government never contacted him. Cameron Wilson,
This Man’s Post Was the First to Be “Corrected” by Facebook under Singapore’s Fake
News Law, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 2, 2019, 9:31 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/cameron
wilson/singapore-fake-news-law-facebook-correction
[https://perma.cc/RUK5-KQXQ].
The editor explained he was contacted by a friend who saw the correction order and then the
editor posted that he would not comply with foreign governmental orders. Id.
62
Mandhana & Dvorak, supra note 60.
63
Id.
64
Mike Butcher, Facebook Bowed to a Singapore Government Order to Brand a News
Post as False, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 30, 2019, 1:05 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/30/
facebook-bowed-to-a-singapore-government-order-to-brand-a-news-post-as-false/ [https://
perma.cc/8FML-Z6LU].
65
Mandhana & Dvorak, supra note 60.
66
See Casey Newton, Singapore’s Fake News Law Should Be a Warning to American
Lawmakers, THE VERGE (Dec. 3, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019
/12/3/20991422/singapore-fake-news-law-censorship-politics-usa [https://perma.cc/N652S2JE] (“But the lesson of Singapore is that the fake-news law you want probably won’t be
used in the way that you want. In fact, it may be used in ways that you don’t want at all!”).
Singapore’s next two POFMA orders were also against “an opposition party or politician, or
a government critic.” Kirsten Han, Want to Criticize Singapore? Expect a ‘Correction
Notice,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/opinion/fakenews-law-singapore.html [https://perma.cc/BWD2-M6KB].
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B. Application of UN Standards
1. The POFMA and ICCPR Article 19
Although Singapore is not a party to the ICCPR,67 the UNGPs expect
companies to assess whether national laws are consistent with international
standards regardless of whether a government has taken on particular human rights
obligations.68 The POFMA fails to meet the ICCPR Article 19(3) standards for
speech restrictions for a variety of reasons.69 For example, its language banning
“false statements of fact” and the definition of such falsehoods70 are classic examples
of inappropriately vague terminology that the UN Special Rapporteur has
condemned as giving too much discretion to governing officials and a lack of notice
to the public.71
In terms of the “necessity” condition, the law fails the “least intrusive means”
test as well. Singapore has not met its burden of showing why good governance and
related measures, including independent fact-checking, media and digital literacy
efforts, and the issuance of governmental notices on its own official website, are
insufficient options in tackling false information. In addition, the law contemplates
criminal punishments for noncompliance, which the UN’s machinery has noted will
rarely constitute the least intrusive means to achieve public interest goals in the
context of combatting false information.72 The third part of Article 19(3)’s tripartite
67
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4
&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/3SXD-K5PQ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). It is also important
to recall that the UNGPs mandate respecting international human rights standards rather than
regional standards. See supra note 21. Singapore is a member of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, which has a regional human rights declaration. Ass’n of Southeast Asian
States [ASEAN] Human Rights Declaration (Nov. 19, 2012), http://asean.org/asean-humanrights-declaration/ [https://perma.cc/NED2-4MT4]. However, this declaration provides
fewer protections than UN standards. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, ASEAN
Declaration on Human Rights Press Statement (Nov. 20, 2012), https://20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200915.htm [https://perma.cc/FJ8C-RPYS] (criticizing
the ASEAN Declaration for limiting human rights in a variety of ways that are inconsistent
with UN standards).
68
UNGPs, supra note 12, at princ. 11 cmt.
69
Though the focus of this Essay is on freedom of expression, it should be noted as
well that the POFMA also poses a variety of privacy concerns. See Jennifer Daskal, This
‘Fake News’ Law Threatens Free Speech. But it Does Not Stop There., N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/opinion/hate-speech-law-singapore.html
[https://perma.cc/AJ4N-4ETF] (explaining how the POFMA allows the government to
“mandate that service providers track the viewing habits of their users in ways that
dangerously threaten their privacy.”).
70
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
71
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
72
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
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test (the legitimacy condition) also does not appear to be met as the initial POFMA
enforcement measures were targeted at regime critics rather than public interest
goals, which indicates the publicly stated goals were mere pretexts for protecting the
government from criticism.73
2. The POFMA and the UNGPs
Given that POFMA is not consistent with the international standard for freedom
of expression, what do UN corporate responsibility standards expect of companies
that face enforcement orders issued under this law? To begin with, platforms should
engage with governments when such bills are being drafted and use their leverage
to urge them not to adopt laws that are inconsistent with international human rights
standards.74 Once a law such as POFMA is adopted, a platform should have in place
procedures to deal with enforcement orders at the appropriate level in the company
and assure steps are taken to avoid infringing human rights to the extent possible.75
When a platform receives a POFMA enforcement order, it should consider
whether to appeal, even though an appeal would not stay the enforcement order
during the appellate process.76 At the very least, a social media company should
consider seeking a request for reconsideration from the minister who issued the
order.77 If the minister denies the reconsideration request, the company should assess
whether to appeal the order for review by a court.78 While POFMA limits the
standards for a successful appeal, lodging an appeal can send a distinct signal to the
government about a corporation’s profound concerns about the law and shed an
additional spotlight on the government’s implementation of the law, both of which
could impact the government’s future implementation choices.
To minimize negative human rights impacts, companies should narrowly
interpret POFMA enforcement orders. For example, when a company places a
correction notice on a post, it should not give oxygen to the government’s
73

See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
In the case of POFMA, it appears that Google and Facebook voiced opposition to the
draft bill. James Griffiths, Singapore Just Used Its Fake News Law. Critics Say It’s Just What
They Feared, CNN BUS. (Nov. 30, 2019, 9:47 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/29/medi
a/singapore-fake-news-facebook-intl-hnk/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7XJ5-DMFM].
However, it is unclear how strenuously such objections were made. In addition, Google,
Facebook, and Twitter noted concerns with the law after it was passed. Michelle Toh, Google
Says Singapore Risks Hurting Innovation with Fake News Law, CNN BUS. (May 9, 2019,
10:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/09/tech/singapore-fake-news-law-tech/index.
html [https://perma.cc/6HN5-6V7B].
75
See UNGPs, supra note 12, at princ. 19.
76
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
77
Id. From the reporting about the first POFMA order issued to a platform, it does not
appear that Facebook requested the government minister to reconsider the order. See
Griffiths, supra note 74; see also Toh, supra note 74.
78
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
74
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assessment of the truth and do the minimum to comply with the law.79 Companies
should also give notice to affected users about the label that will be placed on their
posts.80 Finally, a platform should address any adverse impacts to human rights from
its selected course of action.81 In sum, although implementing the UNGPs does not
exempt social media companies from implementing national laws such as POFMA,
it does require them to “know and show,” which helps shape corporate reactions and
minimize human rights infringements to the extent possible.
C. Falsehoods, Platform Law, Business Models, & Corporate Responsibility
Although the focus of this Essay regards the recent uptick in governmental
“fake news” laws and how responsible corporations should react to them, it is also
worth reflecting briefly on a related issue: social media companies’ own policies and
business models and how they impact human rights when tackling disinformation.
The UNGPs apply not only to corporate reactions to state regulation but also to a
company’s own business decisions that impact human rights.82 According to the
UNGPs, therefore, a social media company must also assess if, in tackling
disinformation, its own business model and platform law infringe on human rights,
including freedom of expression.
One particularly hot issue involving platform law, business models, and the
spread of online falsehoods regards how social media companies treat political ads,
including those placed by politicians as well as issue-specific ads. Recently, major
U.S. social media companies have issued differing policy approaches for political
ads.83 In September 2019, Facebook confirmed it would continue to implement its
existing policy that exempts politicians’ ads (and their organic content) from its
third-party fact-checking program.84 There was a significant backlash that this policy
79

In response to Singapore’s correction notice order, Facebook’s addition to the user’s
post avoided giving credence to the government’s assertion of truth and even provided an
additional link with more information about POFMA as well as the company’s stance in not
taking a position on the truthfulness of either the users’ posts or the government’s
assessments of user speech. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
80
In the case of Facebook’s implementation of the POFMA correction order, the
affected user stated that the company did not give him notice that a label would be put on his
post. Wilson, supra note 61.
81
See UNGPs, supra note 12, at princ. 22.
82
Id. at princ. 11, cmt. (stating that the business responsibility to respect human rights
“exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human
rights”).
83
Gennie Gebhart, Three Political Ad Policies and No Good Answers, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/11/three-politicalad-policies-and-no-good-answers
[https://perma.cc/C575-ZXMG]
(analyzing
the
differences among the political advertisement policies of Facebook, Twitter, and Google).
84
Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/
[https://perma.cc/3UWG-4WV8].
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would enable politicians to promote online falsehoods.85 Facebook’s chief defense
of its policy was that people should be able to see and scrutinize politicians’ ads.86
However, Facebook’s employees stated that such public scrutiny is undermined
because the company provides politicians and campaigns with microtargeting for
their ads, which means users see different ads based on information derived from,
inter alia, behavioral tracking tools.87
Amid reactions to Facebook’s approach, Twitter’s CEO tweeted that his
company would soon ban political advertising, including candidate and issue ads.88
Another Twitter official clarified that the company’s existing policies defined issue
ads as those covering topics of national legislative importance, such as climate
change, immigration, and healthcare.89 Twitter’s CEO stated this ban was not about
free expression because it involved paid advertising rather than organic content.90
Shortly thereafter, the UN Special Rapporteur replied to his tweet, noting political
advertisement policies do indeed impact freedom of expression.91 Commentators
spoke out about the potential adverse free expression impacts of the impending
ban.92 Ultimately, Twitter decided to ban candidate and campaign ads but generally
85

See, e.g., Jeanine Santucci, Elizabeth Warren Targets Facebook Fact-Checking
Policy with False Ad Saying Zuckerberg Endorsed Trump, USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2019, 5:17
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2019/10/12/elizabeth-warren
-targets-trump-zuckerberg-false-facebook-ad/3960138002/ [https://perma.cc/AX5S-Q47R]
(explaining how a candidate for U.S. President purchased a Facebook ad containing a
demonstrably false statement in order to highlight concerns that Facebook’s political ads
policy facilitates the circulation of disinformation around elections).
86
Clegg, supra note 84.
87
Read the Letter Facebook Employees Sent to Mark Zuckerberg About Political Ads,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/technology/facebookmark-zuckerberg-letter.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article [https://
perma.cc/GCS8-4RE9] (calling for an end to microtargeting political ads because it
undermines the public scrutiny needed to assess political speech). In early 2020, Facebook
announced some updates to its political ads policy. Rob Leathern, Expanded Transparency
and More Controls for Political Ads, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/political-ads/
[https://perma.cc/Q9Y8-NYXJ].
Essentially, the company plans to make its public archives of political ads more transparent
and accessible. It will also allow users greater control over the ads they see. Id.
88
Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://twitter.com/jack/
status/1189634360472829952?s=20 [https://perma.cc/3DJE-AK4G].
89
Vijaya Gadde (@vijaya), TWITTER (OCT. 30, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://twitter.com/
vijaya/status/1189664481263046656?s=20 [https://perma.cc/6T5P-4LGE].
90
Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://twitter.com/jack/
status/1189634377057067008?s=20 [https://perma.cc/V4Z6-ZNGD].
91
David Kaye (@davidakaye), TWITTER (OCT. 31, 2019, 1:02 AM), https://twitter.com/
davidakaye/status/1189769465816158210?s=20 [https://perma.cc/T7JZ-H6PN].
92
See, e.g., Will Oremus, Twitter’s Ban on Political Ads Will Hurt Activists, Labor
Groups, and Organizers, MEDIUM (Oct. 31, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/twittersban-on-political-ads-will-hurt-activists-labor-groups-and-organizers-c339908b841d [https:
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allows issue ads, although limiting aspects of microtargeting for such ads.93 At
around the same time, Google issued a policy update that did not ban election ads,
but it did limit certain microtargeting tools for such ads.94
Under the UNGPs, the three companies should have engaged in a global human
rights due diligence analysis that involved input from internal and external
stakeholders to assess how potential policies for political advertisements (combined
with their underlying business models that encompass microtargeting) could impact
human rights globally, including freedom of expression.95 Given the core
significance of political advertising and disinformation to election integrity and
human rights, the companies should also have been as transparent as possible with
the results of any human rights impact assessments that were conducted about their
political ads policies.96 Unfortunately, it seems that such human rights due diligence
may not have occurred prior to the adoption of these policies. Would Twitter’s CEO
have tweeted that banning political ads does not impact freedom of expression if a
global human rights impact analysis had been conducted? Moreover, none of the
companies released human rights impact assessments before adopting their political
ads policies.
To meet the UNGPs corporate responsibility standards, companies need to
assess whether their own business models and platform law infringe human rights,
including freedom of expression.97 In the context of political ads policies, it is worth
briefly examining Twitter’s decision to ban candidate ads.98 Specifically, was an

//perma.cc/94J7-3UXH] (noting downsides of Twitter’s impending ban, including favoring
commercial speech by extractives companies and preventing issue ads about climate
change); Isaac Stanley-Becker, Ban Political Ads on Facebook? Upstart Anti-Trump
Candidates Object, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/ban-political-ads-on-facebook-upstart-anti-trump-candidates-object/2019/11/
09/12be4f1a-fffd-11e9-8501-2a7123a38c58_story.html
[https://perma.cc/984S-JMMF]
(highlighting that a ban on political ads on social media would favor incumbents).
93
Gebhart, supra note 83.
94
Id.
95
See UNGPs, supra note 12, at princs. 17–20 (describing how and when to conduct
human rights due diligence).
96
See id. at princ. 21 (discussing the need to communicate with those outside the
company about human rights impacts).
97
It should be noted that Amnesty International recently issued a report about how
Google and Facebook’s business model of extracting and monetizing the personal data of
users has adverse impacts on a variety of human rights, including privacy and expression.
AMNESTY INT’L, SURVEILLANCE GIANTS: HOW THE BUSINESS MODEL OF GOOGLE AND
FACEBOOK THREATENS HUMAN RIGHTS 7, 21 (2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/docum
ents/pol30/1404/2019/en/ [https://perma.cc/8JW4-NCBA].
98
See generally Lauren Feiner, Twitter Bans Political Ads After Facebook Refused to
Do So, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/30/twitter-bans-politicalads-after-facebook-refused-to-do-so.html [https://perma.cc/LM2S-M355] (noting that
Twitter decided to ban ads from political campaigns). There are additional human rights
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outright ban on such ads the least intrusive means of tackling disinformation, or were
there other measures Twitter could have taken that would have burdened political
speech less while achieving its goal?99
A former Chair of the U.S. Federal Election Commission has argued eloquently
against bans by social media companies on political ads.100 Instead, she favors an
end to the microtargeting that accompanies such ads.101 According to former Chair
Weintraub, microtargeting amplifies disinformation harms by targeting susceptible
groups with political ads that the rest of society does not see.102 Ending such
microtargeting would, she argues, deter disinformation because “malicious
advertisers, foreign and domestic, would be less likely to say to an entire state what
they have been willing to say to a small audience targeted for its susceptibility.”103
She assesses that ending microtargeting would also alleviate the problem of divisive
political ads because advertisers “would have to appeal to a wider audience.”104
Professor Siva Vaidhyanathan has also advocated for an end to microtargeting of
political ads in order to bring wider public scrutiny to advertising as a means of
countering potential disinformation harms.105
Before resorting to speech bans (such as prohibiting candidate ads) as a means
of tackling disinformation, Twitter should have engaged in an analysis of whether it
has other options at its disposal to achieve legitimate public interest goals involving
election integrity.106 Serious arguments have been made that indicate limiting
issues with regard to the various political ads policies discussed in this section, but they are
beyond the scope of this Essay.
99
To respect international freedom of expression standards, Twitter needs to show,
among other things, that its restrictions on speech are the least intrusive means of achieving
a public interest goal. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
100
Ellen L. Weintraub, Don’t Abolish Political Ads on Social Media. Stop
Microtargeting., WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019, 6:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/11/01/dont-abolish-political-ads-social-media-stop-microtargeting/ [https://
perma.cc/XT3D-TY4S].
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. Weintraub proposes that targeting political ads only be allowed when it is
generally no more specific “than one political level below the election at which the ad is
directed.” Id. In other words, an ad for governor could run across a particular state or in
certain districts, but not target individuals more precisely. Id. For presidential elections, she
would be comfortable with ads “targeted down two levels, to the state and then to the county
or congressional district level.” Id.
105
Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Real Reason Facebook Won’t Fact Check Political
Ads, N.Y. T IMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/opinion/facebookzuckerberg-political-ads.html [https://perma.cc/6CAC-84V2]. He also argues that platforms
cannot be trusted with global fact-checking of all candidate and campaign claims throughout
the world. Id.
106
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has also challenged platforms to
“examine the parts of their infrastructure that are acting as a megaphone for dangerous
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microtargeting may sufficiently address potential disinformation harms and could
obviate the need to ban political ads.107 Under the UNGPs, Twitter should grapple
with these questions and provide the public with an assessment of potential negative
human rights impacts from its ban on candidate ads as well as whether ending
microtargeting for such ads would be sufficient to counter disinformation harms.
III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The corporate responsibility of social media companies to respect human rights
when combatting disinformation and misinformation is triggered not only when
companies help governments to implement laws that are inconsistent with
international human rights protections, but also when they adopt platform laws or
business models that adversely affect the enjoyment of human rights. While there
can be no denying that the viral spread of falsehoods over global social media
platforms is problematic, societies must remain vigilant in guarding against
solutions that undermine human rights, including freedom of expression.
The rallying cry for governments to “do something” about false information is
being used to justify a proliferation of “fake news” laws that improperly empower
governments to control discourse, including by enlisting social media companies to
help implement these speech codes. As exemplified in Singapore’s POFMA, such
laws can be inconsistent with international freedom of expression standards because
they are vague, do not reflect the least intrusive means for tackling falsehoods, and
are applied against regime critics rather than for public interest goals.108 The breadth
and implementation of such laws should give us pause in seeking to empower those
already in power—whether in government or corporations—to censor falsehoods.
Even in the absence of state regulation on falsehoods, platforms can undermine
their users’ enjoyment of freedom of expression and other rights when their business
models and policies are not developed with human rights in mind. With rising
concerns about the relationship between social media business models, platform law,
and disinformation harms, it is important that companies assess their policies,
including their approaches to microtargeting, in light of the UNGPs.
Indeed, as complex and challenging as the issue of combatting disinformation
online throughout the world can be, it is important to recall that there is a global,
principled framework for corporate responsibility that provides helpful guidance for
how to proceed. The UNGPs provide companies with substantive standards they
should use to judge human rights impacts of measures to combat disinformation. For
example, while national freedom of expression laws vary significantly throughout
content and address that root cause of the problem rather than censoring users.” See Jillian
C. York, David Greene & Gennie Gebhart, Censorship Can’t Be the Only Answer to
Disinformation Online, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 1, 2019), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2019/05/censorship-cant-be-only-answer-disinformation-online [https://perma.cc
/3TQE-29SR] (noting that platform curation of content can amplify “incendiary content” and
take users “into a rabbit hole of disinformation”).
107
See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text.
108
See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
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the world, the UNGPs anchor assessments of such laws to the international human
rights standard for freedom of expression. This standard gives companies a
substantive benchmark with which to judge not only the legitimacy of governmental
attempts to regulate falsehoods but also to assess whether their own corporate
policies infringe on freedom of expression. The UNGPs also provide a host of
helpful action steps, including human rights due diligence, that companies should
take to ensure they are doing what is possible to avoid infringing on human rights
when combatting disinformation.
Given the extraordinary power and reach of global social media companies in
the worldwide information ecosystem,109 those concerned with the impacts of
disinformation on democracy should encourage such platforms to adhere to the
UNGPs and the substantive standards in international human rights law to guide
their responses to state regulation as well as the development of company policies.
Otherwise, we risk heading not only toward a post-truth world, but also a posthuman rights world.
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